Prospects for Burma After Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release by Charney, Michael W.
Area: Asia-Pacifico 
ARI 32/2011  
Date: 11/2/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
Prospects for Burma After  
Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release (ARI) 
 
Michael W. Charney* 
 
 
Theme: Aung San Suu Kyi’s release will have important implications for the country in 
2011 and 2012. 
 
 
Summary: Aung San Suu Kyi’s release coincided with the holding of national elections for 
a military-designed state to provide the ruling junta with a veneer of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, the lifting of sanctions will remain the central issue facing Burma’s relations 
with foreign countries, which will have to balance out human rights issues and investment 
opportunities. Aung San Suu Kyi and her treatment by the new government will play a 
determining role in deciding this issue. 
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Analysis: Aung San Suu Kyi was released on 13 November 2011 after seven years of 
house arrest (although over the course of the past 21 years she has spent a total of about 
15 years under house arrest). The military junta, led by General Than Shwe, made the 
release shortly after holding the first election in 20 years, although the election in 1990 
was never recognised. Regime sympathisers have portrayed the timing of the release as 
a genuine mark of reform worthy of praise and a reduction in sanctions. In fact, this was 
the scheduled end of her sentence anyway and represented no shift in the regime’s 
approach. 
 
It appears more likely that the regime timed the elections to coincide with Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s arrest, in the hopes perhaps that the release would lend an air of authenticity to the 
nominal transition in power to civilian control. Aside from new structures of government, 
the main figures at the head of Burmese politics remain the same. The country’s ruler, at 
least until he finally relinquishes power, is Than Shwe. The highest civilian post in the new 
government, the presidency, is occupied by the same man who held the top civilian post, 
that of Prime Minister, in the old government, Thein Sein. Under the new constitutional 
arrangements, the military itself will remain the dominant voice in the state. The main 
voice of opposition to the government remains Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the 
officially disbanded, but very much alive, National League for Democracy (NLD). Like their 
leader, since November the party has become re-energised and appears no less popular 
than before. The question that will loom large over the course of the next year is what the 
implications of Aung San Suu Kyi’s release will be for Burma. 
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International Sanctions 
The main issue at the forefront of everyone’s thinking is sanctions and it is the central 
issue influencing Burma’s relationships with other countries. The two most important 
questions about sanctions is how effective they are, and hence how much of a role they 
played in the change of government structures, and whether or not these changes will 
prove to be sufficient for foreign governments to lift the sanctions. 
 
Recent information suggests that sanctions have been effective in hurting certain groups 
with close links to the junta’s top families although much effort has been made to 
encourage the belief that they have been counter-productive. The NLD had originally 
encouraged boycotts on travel to Burma and for Western companies to quit doing 
business with the regime until democratic reforms were made, including the recognition of 
the 1990 election results. The obvious conundrum for sanctions supporters was that 
Burma was already an impoverished country and sanctions would make things worse for 
everyday people rather than for the privileged elite who would find other ways to profit 
even in the worst of times. Certainly, this is evidenced in part by natural gas deals with 
Western energy consortiums, which were able to evade the sanctions, and more recently 
Chinese companies. Deals with these interests have led to a grand enrichment of the 
generals and their families. 
 
Based on the few studies permitted by the regime of the economic impact on the country 
of sanctions, scholars have difficulty assessing how much good (or bad) the sanctions are 
actually achieving. Indeed, when Aung San Suu Kyi was released in November, she 
herself suggested that she might be more amenable concerning ending the sanctions, but 
only once reliable information was available regarding whether the sanctions were having 
an effect and if everyday Burmese were being impacted. International Monetary Fund 
reports on the country have not been made publicly available in recent years making this 
task more difficult. Nevertheless, the most recent information we have suggests that 
everyday Burmese are not being adversely impacted by the sanctions and that the 
sanctions are actually hurting the military elite, however much they have softened the 
blow by other means. Indeed, it is now clear that hopes of ending the sanctions were 
probably the main reason for the creation of the new civilian government anyway –foreign 
governments, the US and the EU in particular, had made these conditions for the end of 
sanctions–. 
 
The NLD has since rearticulated its support for the sanctions and for responsible tourism 
in the country, with a rollback of some sanctions only when the 2,100 political prisoners 
held in the country are released. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Joseph Y. Yun has made it clear that the US will not lift sanctions 
until the military junta meets several conditions. These include: (1) recognition of the NLD; 
(2) release of its political prisoners; and (3) engagement in dialogue with Aung San Suu 
Kyi. An important obstacle is that military strongman Than Shwe’s personal animosity 
towards Aung San Suu Kyi is so great, due to a combination of her international and 
domestic popularity, commitment to principles, and the fact that she is the daughter of the 
national father General Aung San, that he has refused to deal with her at all costs. In 
short, the elections and the release of the famed democracy leader, while hailed by the 
PRC, India and ASEAN as sufficient for the West to end the sanctions, have been 
discounted as superficial, calculated, and generally meaningless by nearly all credible 
accounts of the country. It is unlikely that sanctions will be lifted immediately. 
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It may appear at first glance that the West has little to lose from maintaining the sanctions. 
Most Western companies sold off their local subsidiaries to domestic and other Asian 
buyers long ago and those Western companies that continue to deal with the regime have 
successfully skirted the existing sanctions anyway. The main current and prospective 
investors in Burma, ASEAN countries Thailand and Singapore as well as energy-hungry 
neighbours India and China, have not imposed sanctions. As a result, the dramatic 
increase in investment from China into Burma begun in early 2010 totalling US$8 billion 
(Over £2 billion in fuel, US$5 billion in hydropower, and about US$1 billion in mining), for 
example, will continue to escalate. China is most intent on developing access to Indian 
Ocean trade through Burma, its movement facilitated by a massive railway construction 
programme connecting Yunnan with all of Burma’s major ports. Far from writing off Burma 
to Chinese competitors, however, many Western and Japanese businesses eagerly hope 
for an end to sanctions to do business in the country, which offers a huge field of virtually 
untapped cheap labour (at a time of rising labour costs in China). Such interests will not 
seek to evade the sanctions, however, as the advantages would not outweigh the 
disadvantages of running foul of Western governments or disinvestment campaigners. As 
sanctions fail to be lifted, it is likely that we will see an increase in well-funded 
conferences, debriefings, and websites by anti-sanctions’ advocates calling into question 
the effectiveness of sanctions and focusing discussion on what now appear to be dubious 
claims of the adverse impact on the general population in the country. This ‘smoke and 
mirrors’ approach threatens to confuse the actual situation in the country and may lead to 
the eventual softening of sanctions by some governments in the next few years. 
 
The Role of Aung San Suu Kyi 
Aung San Suu Kyi, denied the mantle of formal political leadership by the regime, has 
demonstrated the ability and willingness to emerge as Burma’s national moral leader. This 
will be a crucial factor in Burma’s near future as the most significant developments in 
Burma in 2011 and 2012 will be social and political. The government has successfully 
fashioned a constitution that leaves the military in control but is civilian enough in its 
structures to appease ASEAN, India and China. However, it is not civilian enough to 
appease Burma’s general population. 
 
Currently, the NLD is attempting to expand its links with other Democratic groups, 
especially those that have emerged in 2010 to participate in the elections. Many 
candidates outside of the main military front party (and political wing of the regime’s mass-
based social organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association or USDA), 
the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), were disappointed with the failure of 
the regime to hold free and fair elections as promised. As a result, the NLD will find fertile 
ground for a considerable broadening of the Democratic front in the country over the 
course of the next year and thus increase further the chances for another military 
crackdown on Democracy campaigners. Aung San Suu Kyi is meanwhile meeting with 
foreign dignitaries in the hopes of ensuring that international attention will be focused on 
Burma’s domestic politics in order to keep up pressure on the regime, which has had a 
notorious record of mistreating political dissidents, in particular when the country is shut to 
foreign media. 
 
Emerging Democratic and Ethnic Forces 
Social unrest on the level of the months leading up to the Saffron Revolution in 2007 is 
also likely in the next few years for several reasons. The military is locked into projects, 
including a possible nuclear weapons programme, for which it needs large amounts of 
money. Much of the money earned from natural gas deals is believed to be siphoned off 
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into private bank accounts outside the country or, which is certainly partly the case 
stockpiled for emergency use, so other state revenues are channelled into defence 
spending, leaving spending on education and health at some of the lowest national levels 
anywhere in the world. This will certainly also be the case regarding revenues from the 
new gas pipeline that is to being built and will be opened in 2013. In the meantime, when 
Western sanctions fail to be lifted as quickly as the regime has hoped, it is going to 
continue to drain much needed investment in social welfare into increased defence 
spending to make up for the difference. The plight of most Burmese, aside from the tiny 
military and business elite will become worse not better in the years ahead. As many 
Burmese are living at a barely subsistence level and in dire health circumstances, any 
worsening of the economic situation even in single-digit percentiles will have devastating 
human consequences. 
 
The new government is also not representative enough to satisfy ethnic hill tribes, many 
of which have not ended their separate conflicts with the regime. Many others that have 
are looking towards revitalising the flagging 50-year-old civil war. While the NLD’s and 
ethnic hill tribes’ woes have been separate matters for the past 20 years, its new strategy 
is to connect the two struggles with the holding of a second Panglong Conference, making 
calls for federalism and democracy kindred political issues. This will present a formidable 
threat to the regime, for Aung San Suu Kyi was clearly supported by the general 
population and the monastic order in the lowlands –join to this the ethnic highlanders and 
it is easy to see a very real potential threat to the regime–. 
 
The re-mobilisation of ethnic hill tribes and lowland mass politics will be a major 
conundrum for the regime. The regime currently benefits from Chinese (and Russian) 
support, both materially in the form of trade, investment and loans, and politically, from 
Chinese (and Russian) protection in the Security Council and diplomatic aid 
internationally. China even extends moral aid through its media and public calls praising 
the military’s behaviour in the country even during some of the worst of times. 
Nevertheless, even China will not support the regime if it fails to deliver regarding security 
on the Burmese side of the frontier with China or in terms of stability within a country in 
which so much Chinese investment in businesses and infrastructure has taken place. 
 
Aung San Suu Kyi clearly recognises the importance of the China factor. Indeed, she has 
gone to pains to explain in the international media that she does not consider China to be 
a threat to Burma. She also welcomes a very close relationship with China, making it clear 
to the regional hegemon and erstwhile incipient superpower that China has nothing to fear 
from her or the NLD. If the military is unable to keep order without major hiccups, 
something it has been unable to do in the past over the long term or if it is unable to 
prevent or indeed if it encourages a major upswing in the civil war in the highland areas, 
Chinese concerns may grow. In either case, China may see the NLD and their dogged 
leader as a safer bet for billions in Chinese investment. 
 
Nevertheless, the regime is taking steps to counter newly emergent democratic and ethnic 
forces. In December 2010, it promulgated a new conscription law to require two years of 
military service from men 18 to 45 years of age and women 18 to 35 years of age. In the 
last few years, the USDA has grown to 25 million members because of intimidation and 
the limitation of economic opportunities in the impoverished country to members. The 
regime has also recently acquired new advanced weapons systems with which to secure 
its position, centred on the new and heavily defended capital at Naypyidaw. 
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Conclusion: As the regime fails to win concessions on sanctions from the West and 
Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic rebels demonstrate popular support, we can expect the 
chronically paranoid military leadership to worsen not better its treatment of its opponents. 
It will most likely increase the incarceration of political prisoners, return Aung San Suu Kyi 
to house arrest, and tighten even more controls on communications within the country and 
with the outside world. The military will probably also initiate a renewed military campaign 
against ethnic areas within the next two years, although this will be risky given negative 
Chinese reactions to the fighting in Kokang in August 2009, in order to finally put an end 
to its woes on its periphery. At the same time, the military has also made an attempt in the 
formation of the new government to indicate the inclusiveness possible through 
cooperation with the selection of an ethnic Shan as one of the official nominees for 
President in nominal competition with Thein Sein and Tin Aung Myint Oo for the position. 
Ultimately, the losers were instead each made one of the country’s two Vice-presidents. 
 
What the regime will be less prepared for are challenges from within the military and, to a 
lesser extent, the business elite. The new constitution (2008) and newly-elected (2010) 
government have been arranged to make the head of the military the most powerful 
person in the country, to give the military virtual veto-powers in the different parliamentary 
bodies, and make the military separate from the state in defence and security matters. 
While this makes the state vulnerable to the military, it also gives a broader and deeper 
range of exposure to civilian leaders and nominal democratic structures to military 
officers, taking them out of the seclusion of the army camp and into the political training 
ground that is a parliament. 
 
Simultaneously, the sell-off of state properties and businesses, on the order of 300 last 
year, at bargain basement prices in the privatisation bonanza that took place in 2009 and 
2010 (and what remains will likely be sold off in 2011 and 2012) favoured the most 
connected families among the military elite. Most soldiers and even most low-ranking 
officers earn very little. With sanctions and corruption limiting the flow of financial gain to 
the few rather than the many, it is highly likely that new forces within the military, 
motivated by greed, self-preservation or even a combination of professionalism and 
nationalism may threaten the regime from within. Certainly, in Burmese political culture, 
factionalism has always been a factor characterising every civilian and military 
government since the end of colonial rule, leading most recently to the ousting and arrest 
of General Khin Nyunt in 2004. Resurgent factionalism within the governing elite may 
prove the regime’s Achilles heel and Aung San Suu Kyi’s best opportunity. 
 
This report draws upon analyses by a number of researchers, including Andrew Selth and 
Sean Turnell, as well as news articles and policy reports. 
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